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Regulatory scheme for utilities: proposal for Ukraine 
Executive summary 
Unprofitable frame conditions in Ukraine’s utilities sector, frequent political interventions into 
price setting as well as the lack of strong political will to implement structural reforms diminish 
significantly the attractiveness of the sector for investments. To solve these problems it is 
necessary to ensure transparent and reliable conditions for economic activities in the sector. 
Ukrainian policy makers have increasingly realized that this can best be achieved by 
introducing an independent regulatory scheme. The construction of an appropriate regulatory 
scheme is not a trivial task. In fact, answering the question of “how to regulate?” appears to be 
much more important than solving the issue of “who regulates?”, on which the current political 
debate tends to focus. 
For the case of the utility sector in Ukraine we believe that regulation should simultaneously 
achieve three important goals. It should ensure that prices are cost-covering, it should give 
incentives to reduce costs, and it should stimulate (and, if necessary, force) firms to improve 
management and factor productivity. Against this background, we propose Yardstick 
competition as the appropriate regulatory mechanism. As this scheme is rather complex to 
introduce, we also outline a strategy for its gradual introduction over a 3-5 years period. 
Moreover, based on a unique data set on Ukrainian Vodokanals we demonstrate the 
methodology that the regulator should use and show how this approach can be made 
operational for the case of Ukraine. Although our analysis is rather preliminary in nature, it 
already provides robust and meaningful results. This should be used as a basis for additional 
and more sophisticated quantitative work. 
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1 Introduction: What is effective regulation? 
Providing utility services is very costly since it needs substantial infrastructure and resources. 
Thus, service providers seek high enough prices since they need profits that are sufficient for 
paying their own obligations and attracting capital for necessary investments. On the other 
hand, consumers want utility prices to be as low as possible. On competitive markets the task 
of balancing opposite interests of consumers and producers is left to market forces. On utility 
markets, unfortunately, competition cannot perform this task because the markets are locally 
separated and limited availability and access rights to the necessary infrastructure create 
several bottlenecks. Thus public utility providers are in a monopoly position and regulation of 
tariff setting is necessary to prevent abuse of market power.  
The role of independent regulation in such markets is very important. It balances the interests 
of all stakeholders in the particular sector and guarantees sustainable development of the 
sector. Thus, it intents to protect consumers from monopoly prices while ensuring that the 
service provider remains viable and has incentives to perform efficiently. Using its regulatory 
powers the regulator maximizes total welfare, which consists of the benefits of consumers and 
producers plus externalities. As a result of well-performing regulation, consumers achieve high 
quality of services at low prices, while producers earn sufficient profits and have incentives to 
make investments for sustainable development. 
In Ukraine the discussions about regulatory reform in the industry of public utilities has already 
continued for several years. A new strategy of regulatory reform in the sector is currently 
disputed among stakeholders. Creation of a regulatory body for the utilities is also considered. 
Recently policy makers commenced speculating on the issue ‘what executive body is going to 
be empowered with new regulatory functions’1. In this paper we want to highlight that instead 
of discussing who the regulator will be it is more important to think about how to regulate. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the institution of a regulator; Chapter 3 discusses parameters and 
methods of regulation. Chapter 4 provides a proposal of a regulatory scheme that is aimed to 
solve current problems of Ukrainian public utilities sector. Chapter 5 concludes. 
2 Who regulates? 
The regulatory power is usually vested in a separate authority, called independent regulator. 
This institution has to be endowed with the legal power necessary to balance the interests of 
consumers and service providers. There are six criteria of an effective regulatory system: 
coherence, predictability, capacity, independence, accountability and transparency2. 
Coherence implies that regulatory policies are based on laws, which are consistently 
implemented. In particular, there must be a clear division among national and municipal 
regulators and government ministries. Predictability means that there will not be sudden 
changes in regulatory framework or in the way a regulator makes decisions. Predictability is 
particularly important for investors. Capacity requires that a regulatory agency is staffed with 
qualified people and has the authority and appropriate levels of funding to implement their 
mandate effectively. Coherence, predictability and capacity are general prerequisites for 
effective regulation. The other three criteria are more specific for each sector.   
To perform effectively, the regulator must be independent from political interference (both 
from central Ministries, local governments and other authorities) as well as from decisive 
influence of industry, investors or customers. To ensure this, the institution needs financial 
autonomy, fixed term of office, pre-specified appointment criteria, and sufficient resources. The 
                                       
1  Among candidates to do regulatory work are the National Electricity Regulation Commissions (NERC), 
the State Committee On Utilities and Housing or the Anti-Monopoly Committee. 
2 ‘ Transition Report 2004: Infrastructure’, EBRD publication, November 2004 
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regulator’s activities must also be accountable, which means that it enforces rules fairly while 
protecting the legal rights and economic interests of the state, operators and users. 
Transparency covers several issues. It involves the right of all stakeholders to be informed 
about decisions affecting them, and also relates to the scope for corruption and secretive 
decision-making. 
In principle, for each industry that requires regulation there can be different, specific 
regulators, or a general regulator who overlooks all such industries. The tradeoff is that 
branch-specific regulators have deeper knowledge about their respective industry while the 
general regulator is easier (and cheaper) to be created and less vulnerable to vested, branch 
specific interests.  
Ukraine already has experience with establishing independent regulatory authorities. Currently 
two commissions are acting – National Electricity Regulation Commissions (NERC), which sets 
the domestic wholesale prices for gas and electricity, and the National Commission for 
Communication Regulation (NCCR) that mainly focuses on Ukraine’s telecommunication 
market. However, performance of both regulators is not that effective. The law on NERC has 
not been adopted and NERC is acting on the basis of a Presidential Decree3 since 1998, which 
adds a certain degree of uncertainty to the performance of the commission. While NERC 
funding comes mainly from licenses fees and its members are appointed for a specified term, it 
is still far from being politically independent. Nevertheless, NERC operates reasonably well 
according to transparency criteria. It publishes its annual reports as well as all decisions. 
However, reasoning behind its decisions and rules taken by NERC are not always clear and 
available.  
The NCCR is a newly created regulatory body, which due to political problems with appointment 
of its staff started its operations only after a four-months time lag. Hence, this institution is – 
at least during its start period – far from being politically independent, and – until now – has no 
experience in conducting its regulatory mission. 
Thus, commencing a regulatory reform in utilities sector policy makers cannot rely only on the 
existing experience with the regulators. That experience rather has to be reconsidered and 
substantially improved.  
3 What to Regulate and How? 
The objective of the regulator should be to protect consumers from monopoly prices while 
ensuring that the service provider can operate under economically sufficient conditions. To 
achieve this, regulation can focus on costs and profits of operations, output prices, productivity 
levels (measured e.g. in factor productivities), on other parameters such as quality levels, or 
on a mix of them. It can act either prescriptively, i.e. by fixing certain ‘accepted’ profit levels, 
or stimulating, i.e. by providing incentives for increasing productivity or reducing costs. 
However, since the specific task facing the regulator can be very different, i.e. depending on 
the circumstances under which a respective industry is operating, there is no general blueprint 
for successful regulatory policy under all possible conditions. Instead, the choice of an 
appropriate design of regulation is crucial for its success in every specific situation. The most-
commonly used forms of regulation are as follows: 
First, price levels can be set to cover costs plus some given profit (cost-plus or profit-cap 
regulation). This purely prescriptive type of regulation is the easiest to implement. If specified 
in a sufficiently predictable and accountable manner, it is capable to attract investors for large 
infrastructure projects because it minimizes operating risks for both, investors and 
government. On the other hand, the fixed rewarding system does not provide incentives to 
reduce costs or raise productivity and quality levels. Since cost-plus regulation usually sets 
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firm-specific price levels, it also fails to improve competitiveness of different firms. Rather, it 
can even stimulate manipulation by reporting/creating higher costs. Hence, cost-plus regulation 
is appropriate only for industries with high external risks and uncertainty, but private 
participation based on cost-plus regulation should be arranged for short periods only. 
The second approach is to simply set the maximum tariff that the firm is allowed to charge 
(price-cap regulation). In general, this provides an incentive to reduce costs and to raise factor 
productivity in order to increases profits. Over time, however, price-caps have to be adjusted 
to prevent extranormal profits. The problem is that if this correction is done for each firm 
separately, price-cap regulation does not provide strong incentives for cost reduction any more, 
because higher profits due to lower costs will be reduced through lower output prices. On the 
other hand, if price-caps are adjusted based on industry averages, this can lead to insufficient 
treatment of firms, which have to operate under specific conditions such as relatively long 
networks, low consumer density per square meter etc. Hence, the challenge facing the 
regulator in price-cap schemes is to find sufficient clusters of firms that are sufficiently big, so 
that incentives to reduce costs for each firm are not too much reduced by adjusted maximum 
prices, and still specific enough to consider the natural characteristics of different firms. 
Obviously, such regulatory approach is much more complex to be implemented since the 
regulator needs to monitor external (i.e. labor and energy costs) as well as sector-internal 
developments (i.e. changes in productivity) in order to adjust the price cap. This type of 
regulation also implies higher risks for business operations.  
Table 1 
Comparison of different approaches for regulation 
 Regulatory approaches  
 Cost 
plus/ROR 
Price cap Yardstick 
competition 
Comments 
Incentives for     
Productivity growth Low Medium High  
Priorities     
Covering costs + + +  
Improving 
competitiveness 
- + +  
Encouraging cost 
reduction 









+ - -  
Source: ‘Coming In From The Cold: Improving District Heating Policy In Transition Economies’, OECD/IEA 2004, own 
considerations.  
The third approach is to compare productivity levels4 of different firms that for reasons such as 
regional separation cannot directly compete with one another (Yardstick competition). Based on 
this comparison the regulator identifies the practices of best-performing firms in the sample. 
Then, he adjusts the firm-specific targets of other firms accordingly in order to force them to 
adopt the identified best practices. In this way, the regulator set tailor-made, firm-specific 
                                       
4  Several definitions exist for productivity. In this paper, we define productivity as the ability of a firm 
to produce a given output with a minimum set of inputs. 
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development targets without distorting incentives by hurting the best performers. In other 
words, all firms are put in conditions conducive to competition. As a result, a seemingly 
monopolized industry can still reap the fruits of competition such as enhancing technological 
advances, improving product and service quality and reducing production costs. However, this 
methodology is obviously rather complex to be applied and cannot be implemented over night. 
In summary, cost-plus regulation is easy to implement but fails to stimulate cost reduction. 
Price-cap regulation delivers such incentives, however to a limited degree and at the expense 
of complexity. Finally, Yardstick competition is the most complex approach to implement, but it 
also creates the strongest incentives towards cost reduction and productivity increases. This 
discussion is also summarized in table 1. 
4 Proposal for regulatory scheme in water supply 
The current situation of the utility sector in Ukraine is characterized by tariff levels below 
operational costs and by a relatively high use of energy input per unit of output due to largely 
depleted and outdated installations, excessive losses etc. Obviously, preventing the sector from 
collapsing requires cost-covering tariff levels as well as reduced costs of operation through 
increased energy efficiency. In principle, all types of regulation are capable to ensure such 
cost-covering tariff levels. However, as discussed in the previous section, only price-cap 
regulation and Yardstick competition give sufficient incentives for reducing costs and increasing 
energy efficiency. Furthermore, empirical studies (see Box 1) find large differences in costs and 
factor productivity across water supply firms with a relatively big share of poorly performing 
firms. Hence, an appropriate regulatory scheme should set the strongest-possible incentives to 
reduce costs and improve management and factor productivity. Against this background it 
appears that Yardstick competition is the optimal regulatory tool for Ukraine’s water 
supply industry. To demonstrate how this could be implemented we will now present a concrete 
example for the case of Ukraine’s water supply industry. Starting from the present situation, 
Yardstick competition can be gradually introduced in the following three steps: 
Step 1: 
The starting point for the necessary regulatory reform is to establish an independent regulatory 
authority. Possible candidates are the State Committee On Utilities and Housing, the Anti-
Monopoly Committee, or the NERC. Alternatively, a new institution can be founded. From an 
economic rather than from a political perspective, either one of these institutions could perform 
the task as long as it fulfills the above mentioned criteria of coherence, predictability, capacity, 
independence, accountability, and transparency as good as possible, and applies a sufficient 
regulatory approach as we will describe in the next two steps.  
Step 2: 
To ensure equal starting conditions for all firms we propose introducing price-cap regulation for 
an initial period of 2 to 3 years. Therefore, prices should be set for each firm separately at 
recent historical costs levels (e.g. at the average of reported costs for 2004 and 2005).5 In 
order for tariffs to account for changes in inputs prices an indexation system will be necessary. 
In general, several existing indices such as CPI or PPI can be used. However to match future 
price developments as closely as possible to the true costs of operation we propose using an 
industry-specific cost index that has to be computed on the basis of price developments for the 
main input factors (labor and energy) weighted by shares computed from the reported 
                                       
5  Using previously reported information avoids giving incentives for over reporting of cost levels as it 
e.g. the case for cost-plus regulation. Setting firm-level rather than e.g. oblast-level prices is justified 
because of significant differences in observed cost levels across firms (see Figure A-1 in the appendix for 
differences in costs of water suppliers by Oblast). 
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information. We therefore propose that changes of Price-Caps for each single firm (ΔPf) should 
be given by an index value CI, which replicates changes in average cost in the industry:6 
 
 ΔPf = CI   (1) 
 
In addition, during the second stage of the reform the regulator should already start preparing 
for the introduction of Yardstick competition. Therefore, a data base and data collection system 
should be set up to enable the regulator to conduct productivity analyses for all firms in the 
industry. During this phase of reform the regulator have to start a quantitative research of 
productivity analysis of firms in the sector, in particular, the correct empirical model for 
analysis have to be chosen among the range of possible ones.7 This will deliver first insights 
into productivity changes and potential sources of productivity growth and cost reduction in the 
industry. It will also give the regulator the opportunity to establish and improve the necessary 
methodology in a dialogue with all stakeholders and to increase their understanding of the 
regulatory approach that will be used in the third step. 
Step 3: 
After the initial transition period, the regulator should move to Yardstick competition. Under 
this regulatory regime, changes in the Price-Caps for each single firm (ΔPf) are now determined 
by the average cost index CI minus a firm-specific factor Xf: 
 
 ΔPf = CI - Xf  (2) 
 
Before we present some first calculations of the firm-specific factor Xf for Ukraine’s water 
suppliers, we first discuss the underlying principles based on the following example. Assume 
that input costs for an industry are expected to increase by 5% on average during next years 
(CI=5%) and that the regulator finds from comparing the productivity levels of different firms 
that a specific one could produce the same output by using 2 percent less inputs.8 To enforce 
this 2% increase in productivity the regulator sets the X-factor for this firm at Xf=2% so that 
its Price-Cap (regulation target) is only allowed to change by ΔPf = 5%-2% = 3%.9 In words, 
the firm is forced to improve its productivity since its output price is allowed to grow at only a 
smaller rate than average input costs are expected to do. The example can be further 
expanded by assuming that already efficient firms will continue to improve their productivity. If 
e.g. the regulator knows that Total Factor Productivity of the industry grows by 3% in the 
relevant period10, he will increase all firm-specific X-factors by another 3%. In this case, the X-
factor for the inefficient firm in our example will be set to Xf=2%+3%=5% such that its Price-
Cap remains unchanged (ΔPf = 5%-5%). In this case, the firm is forced to improve its 
                                       
6  For more details see e.g. Bernstein and Sappington (1999). Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap 
Regulation Plans. Journal of Regulatory Economics (Vol.16), pp.5-25. 
7  E.g. there should be decided what inputs and outputs to include in the final model.  
8  Which means that other firms in the industry have demonstrated that such a more efficient production 
is possible. 
9  The calculation in this example requires strict initial cost coverage without that the firm earns 
extranormal profits. This in particular means that capital costs are already included in the cost formula. 
Otherwise, a 2% increase in input efficiency cannot be achieved by a corresponding 2% reduction of the 
output price. Rather, the formula must also consider the relevant profit/cost ratio. However, this is not 
necessary in our reform proposal since initial cost coverage has already been enforced in the first step. 
10  To calculate overall TFP change in an industry requires additional empirical analysis, for which the 
panel data of major performance indicators of enterprises for several years is needed.   
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productivity level since its output price has to remain unchanged while input costs are expected 
to increase. 
On the basis of empirical results of a first productivity analysis for water-supplying firms in 
Ukraine (Box 1) we will now demonstrate how firm-specific X-factors could be specified in 
practice. Table 2, which shows technical productivity scores for 232 Vodokanals, marks the 
starting point for this discussion.11 As the Productivity Index in Column (4) indicates, 
Vodokonals of Truskavets and Komsomolks operate most efficiently, while Vodokanals of 
Novomoskovsk, Artemovsk or Hmelnik are the least efficient ones in our sample. The index 
level of 0.10 means that productivity of those firms – that is the productivity of the factors they 
are using – stands at only 10% of what best-performing firms with an index level of 1.00 
demonstrate. In other words, closing the productivity gap relative to the industry champion(s) 




Productivity levels of water supply firms in Ukraine – Empirical Evidence 
In paper A01/2005 ‘Assessing productivity of water supply in Ukraine’ we calculate productivity scores in 
order to assess and compare production productivity at the enterprise level.* Our study finds substantial 
differences in productivity levels across firms in the sector. This result is not surprising, since the industry has 
been operating in an isolated fashion and influenced by populist decisions of local policy makers rather than 
by competitive pressure and hard budget constraints. Comparing the large differences in productivity levels of 
the Ukrainian samples with results of similar studies for other countries in e.g. Asia and South America, 
where firms have been operating under more sophisticated regulatory schemes, demonstrates that 
productivity-oriented regulation has a huge potential for improving performance (and thus, reducing costs of 
operation) of Ukrainian water suppliers. 
 
* Given the limited ability of firm-level data, we measure technical productivity scores using the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA allows estimating productivity score on the basis of any inputs and 
outputs, (that is, we do not have to have data on all inputs and outputs of the production process). It involves 
mathematical programming to construct a non-parametric piece-wise surface (i.e. a production frontier) over 
the data. A production frontier represents the maximum output that can be produced for a given amount of 
input and thus identifies best-practice performance in a sample of firms. The most efficient firms form a 
frontier (i.e. they lie exactly on a frontier), while less efficient firms lie below this frontier. Then, productivity 
scores are calculated relative to this surface. 
To use this information for calculation of firm-specific X-factors we need to recall that this 
factor should consider two components, a) firm-specific requirements for improving individual 
productivity levels relative to better performing firms, and b) industry-wide requirements for 
improving Total Factor Productivity. A first example for how those X-factors could be calculated 
is given in column (5). For these calculations, we have assumed that Total Factor Productivity 
is expected to increase by not more than 1% per year over the next five years.12 For the same 
period, we require each firm with an initial Productivity Index of less than 1.00 to cut its 
productivity gap by e.g. half. In general, it is a political discussion how much of the inefficiency 
                                       
11  The data was collected in 2002 as a part of the project of Danish Cooperation for Environment in 
Eastern Europe (DANCEE), Ministry of Environment of Denmark and Ukrainian State Committee for 
Housing and Municipal Economy. 
12  Estimation of overall TFP changes in the sector did not revealed steady continuous changes that could 
be set as an average goal for the sector. In fact, TFP measure changes in opposite directions during 2000-
2004 years. However, to illustrate the method we believe that an annual increase of 1% for the water 
supply industry still appears to be justified.  
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have to be caught up by firms.13 This have to be decided be the regulator. In this case, the 
Vodokanals of Novomoskovsk, Artemovsk or Hmelnik will have to reduce their productivity gap 
by (1-0.1)/2=45% or 7.7% p.a. over the next five years.14 Hence, the X-factor for the 
Vodokanals of Truskavets and Komsomolks is set at 1%, which is the expected sector-wide 
increase of Total Factor Productivity, while e.g. the X-factor for the Vodokanals of 
Novomoskovsk, Artemovsk or Hmelnik is set equal to 1%+7.7%=8.7%. Finally, combining 
these firm-specific X-factors with the expected change of index CI (change of input costs) gives 
the overall changes for firm-specific price caps (ΔPf, see description above). 
Table 2 
Calculation of firm-specific X-factors, 200215 











 2 3 4 5 6 5+6 
1 Donetsk Komsomolsk  1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1 L'viv Truskavets 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
… … … … …  … 
6 Vinnytsya Pogrebiche  0.91 1.00 0.88 1.88 
7 Donetsk Zhdanovka  0.88 1.00 1.17 2.17 
7 Zakarpatska Mezhgorye  0.88 1.00 1.17 2.17 
… … … … …  … 
33 Donetsk Nikolaevka  0.64 1.00 3.36 4.36 
38 Chernihiv Borzna  0.63 1.00 3.45 4.45 
40 Zhytomyr Olevsk  0.62 1.00 3.54 4.54 
40 Donetsk Maryinka  0.62 1.00 3.54 4.54 
42 Chernihiv Bobroviza  0.61 1.00 3.63 4.63 
… … … … …  … 
232 Dnipropetrovsk Novomoskovsk  0.10 1.00 7.71 8.71 
232 Donetsk Artemovsk  0.10 1.00 7.71 8.71 
232 Vinnytsya Hmelnik  0.10 1.00 7.71 8.71 
Source: Own calculations 
5 Conclusion 
The current technical and financial state of Ukraine’s utility sector is very poor. Unprofitable 
frame conditions, frequent political interventions into price setting as well as the lack of strong 
political will to implement structural reforms diminish significantly the attractiveness of the 
sector for investments. To solve these problems it is necessary to ensure transparent and 
reliable conditions for economic activities in the sector. Ukrainian policy makers have 
                                       
13  Inefficiency scores are also not transferred 1 for 1 into the Price Cap Formula because of 
methodological distrust. 
14  Since 077.1)45.01(
5 =+  
15  Sample. See Table A-2 in the  Appendix for the full table. 
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increasingly realized that this can best be achieved by introducing an independent regulatory 
authority. However, we have argued in this paper that experiences with independent regulation 
in other sectors of Ukraine’s economy have been rather mixed so that a regulatory reform in 
the utility sector cannot rely only on the existing experience. In particular, the construction of 
an appropriate regulatory scheme is not a trivial task. In fact, answering the question of “how 
to regulate?” appears to be much more important than solving the issue of “who 
regulates?”, on which the current political debate tends to focus. In European regulatory 
practice discussions about the most appropriate regulation scheme are also continue. The UK 
regulatory experience, which is based on Yardstick competition scheme, tends to be more 
successful in providing appropriate incentives for industries.  
For the case of the utility sector in Ukraine we believe that regulation should simultaneously 
achieve three important goals. It should ensure that prices are cost-covering, it should give 
incentives to reduce costs, and it should stimulate (and, if necessary, force) firms to improve 
management and factor productivity. Against this background, we propose Yardstick 
competition as the appropriate regulatory mechanism. As this scheme is rather complex to 
introduce, we also outline a strategy for its gradual introduction over a 3-5 years period. 
Moreover, based on a unique data set on Ukrainian Vodokanals we demonstrate the 
methodology that the regulator should use and show how this approach can be made 
operational for the case of Ukraine. Although our analysis is rather preliminary in nature, it 
already provides robust and meaningful results. This should be used as a basis for additional 
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